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LEGISLATION
IMMUNITY FOR WITNESSES BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES:
THE SCOPE OF SECTION 3486
The Historical Perspective
In 1857 Congress passed its first immunity statute as an aid to a
House committee investigating charges of parliamentary corruption.'
The statute, designed to overcome the difficulties Congress experi-
enced in compelling witnesses to make disclosures,2 exonerated wit-
nesses from prosecution ". . . for any fact or act touching which he
shall be required to testify. . . ." 3 This experiment in immunity
was short-lived when it developed that a host of wrongdoers flocked
to congressional committees to absolve themselves in this new
"immunity bath." 4 In fact, an Interior Department official escaped
prosecution by relating to a congressional committee how he em-
bezzled two million dollars of public funds in federal bonds.5 These
abuses moved Congress to amend the immunity statute in 1862 so
that witnesses who testified would not be shielded from prosecution;
this amendment merely provided that their testimony given before
the committee should not be used against them in any subsequent
criminal proceeding.6
However, because of the decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock,7
the 1862 amendment proved to be an ineffectual means of compelling
incriminatory disclosures. The Counselnan case held that a witness
may still assert his privilege against self-incrimination in the face of
a statute which merely forbids the subsequent use of his testimony
since such a statute is not coextensive with the privilege which it
seeks to supplant. If the witness were compelled to answer, reasoned
the Court, although his testimony could not subsequently be used
against him, he would still be incriminating himself, for the statute
could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to
1 See Grant, Immunity frmn Comndsory Self-Incrimination in a Federal
System of Government I, 9 TEiMP. L.Q. 57, 62 (1934).
2 See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 338 (1950); Comment, 18
ALBANY L. REv. 173, 177 (1954).
311 STAT. 156 (1857).
4 See King, Immunity for Witnesses: An Inventory of Caveats, 40 A.B.A.J.
377, 380 (1954) ; Smelser, The Grand Inqitest of the Nation, 29 NoTRE DAME
LAW. 163, 171 (1954).
See King, supra note 4.
612 STAT. 333 (1862).
7 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him ... in
a criminal proceeding... ." 8
The Supreme Court, however, suggested in the Counselm"n case
that a statute which afforded ". . . immunity against future prosecu-
tion for the offence to which the question relates" would be effectual
to prohibit the witness from claiming his privilege.9 Accordingly,
Congress enacted, as part of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1893,
an immunity provision which required a witness to testify before the
Interstate Commerce Commission but exempted him from prosecution
".... for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning
which he may testify .... " 10 This statute was declared by the Su-
preme Court in Brown v. Walker 11 as extending protection equal
to that of the privilege so that the witness could be compelled to
answer. Thereafter, Congress has, from time to time, incorporated
this statute into more than twenty regulatory statutes, available to
witnesses who appear before various governmental commissions and
agencies. 12
Nevertheless, from 1862 until August, 1954, congressional com-
mittees were equipped with no such immunity weapon to ferret out
information. Instead, during that span of time, there remained on
the books the abortive statute-found in Title 18, Section 3486 of
the United States Code 83-- which merely granted testimony immunity
to congressional witnesses, an immunity held insufficient to prevent
witnesses from raising their privilege.1 4 However, in the years pre-
ceding 1954, congressional committees investigating subversive activ-
ities were confronted with numerous witnesses who abused and pros-
tituted the privilege against self-incrimination to the extent "... that
it is fast becoming looked upon by many law-abiding persons with
doubt and suspicion." 16 In order to restore the diminishing faith in
the privilege, and to enable itself to obtain adequate information upon
which to legislate,' Congress amended Section 3486 so that in any
congressional investigation relating to subversive activities,
... no witness shall be excused from testifying or from producing books,
papers, or other evidence before ... any committee of either House ...on
8 Id. at 564.
9 Id. at 586.
1027 STAT. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. §46 (1952).
1' 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
12 For a collection of these statutes see Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1,
6 n.4 (1948).
13 "No testimony given by a witness before either House, or before any
committee of either House ... shall be used as evidence in any criminal pro-
ceeding against him in any court.... ." This section was replaced by the recent
enactment of Section 3486, effective August 20, 1954.
34 See note 7 .supra.
15 H.R. Rep. No. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) in 16 U.S. CoDE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws at 5247 (Sept. 5, 1954).
.6old. at 5247-5249.
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the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to in-
criminate him .... But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or
thing concerning which he is so compelled, after having claimed his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence. .... 1
This language is essentially similar to that of the immunity
statute upheld by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Walker,18 wherein
the Court exhaustively discussed its constitutionality and concluded
that it afforded protection coextensive with the privilege.
In addition, Section 3486 contains features which should fore-
stall the abuses and "immunity baths" brought about by the 1857
statute which also forbade prosecution of witnesses who testified be-
fore congressional committees. Under the new statute, witnesses
must claim their privilege before they are granted immunity 9 This
then puts the committee on ". . . notice that a serious and important
decision has been placed upon them." 20 The committee will then
have the opportunity to deliberate and investigate the feasibility of
granting immunity. The statute also requires the committee to obtain
the approval of the district court for the district wherein the in-
quiry is being carried on before any immunity can be granted
to the witness.21  In the proceeding before the district court, the
Attorney General is given an opportunity to raise objections to a
congressional grant of immunity.22 Thus, if the district court judge
decides that a grant of immunity would serve to embarrass an in-
vestigation being conducted by the Justice Department, or that the
need to punish the witness outweighs the value of obtaining his tes-
timony, he could refuse to issue the required order of immunity. In
such a case, the witness could not be compelled to testify. The
1857 immunity statute contained no such safeguards.
Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the new Section 3486
provides for a grant of immunity to witnesses only before committees
investigating subversive activities.2 3  Congress has, in effect, by so
17 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (a) (Supp. 1954). The new statute also contains similar
immunity provisions available to the Attorney General in grand jury or trial
proceedings concerning subversive activities. 18 U.S.C. § 3486(c) (Supp. 1954).
is 161 U.S. 591 (1896). The Court also considered the argument that only
the President has the power to pardon, but decided an immunity statute is
"virtually an act of general amnesty" which is within the power of Congress.
Id. at 601.
19 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a) (Supp. 1954).
20H.R. Rep. No. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) in 16 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. Nnws at 5250 (Sept. 5, 1954).
21 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a) (Supp. 1954).
221d. §3486(b).23 d. §3486(a) ("In the course of any investigation relating to any in-
terference with or endangering of, or any plans or attempts to interfere with
or endanger the national security or defense of the United States by treason,
sabotage, espionage, seditious conspiracy or the overthrow of its Government
by force or violence....").
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limiting Section 3486, repealed the old section 24 which only pro-
hibited the subsequent use of testimony given before any congressional
committee. Henceforth witnesses before congressional committees,
other than those investigating subversive activities, are afforded no
protection whatever against the subsequent use of their testimony in
criminal proceedings. This repeal, however, could not work retro-
actively, so as to allow the Government to now use, in criminal prose-
cutions against witnesses who had previously testified before con-
gressional committees, the testimony they gave when the old Section
3486 was in force.25
Privilege and Immunity: Their Scope
An immunity statute which effectively prevents the assertion of
the privilege against self-incrimination represents a solution of a con-
flict of two principles: the need of Congress to investigate, which is
perhaps "more critical now than at any time in the history of the
world"; 26 and second, the privilege of witnesses to withhold incrim-
inating information-a privilege which ". . . grows out of the high
sentiment and regard of our jurisprudence for conducting . . . inves-
tigatory proceedings upon a plane of dignity, humanity and impar-
tiality." 27 No evaluation of an immunity statute would be complete,
therefore, without comparing it to the judicially declared scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination. For unless in practice immunity
is coextensive with the privilege, there has really been no solution of
the conflict.
Disclosures Protected
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the witness from
giving any answer which may tend to incriminate him by furnishing
a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute him.28  As to
what answers would "tend" to incriminate, Wigmore states that only
those which would establish an element of the crime tend to incrim-
inate. 29  There is language by Chief Justice Marshall o and in the
24 See note 13 supra.
25 Cf. Cameron v. United States, 231 U.S. 710 (1914).
26 United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (D.D.C. 1951), aff'd,
203 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
27 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
28 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951) ; see Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950).
29 See 8 WIGNifOR, EVIDENcE § 2260 (3d ed. 1940).
30 See United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,692e, at 40 (C.C.D. Va.
1807) ("It would seem, then, that the court ought never to compel a witness
to give an answer which discloses a fact that would form a necessary and
essential part of a crime which is punishable by the laws.").
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case of Mason v. United States 31 which seems to express this view.
Nevertheless, the authorities are abundant to the effect that "tend to
incriminate" includes any answer which may furnish a clue to the
finding of other evidence which is incriminating.3 2 Indeed, implicit
in those cases 3 3 which hold a testimony-immunity statute not co-
extensive with the privilege is the rationale that the privilege encom-
passes disclosure of leads which these statutes could not prevent.
However, the privilege is confined to those answers which may in
some real and substantial way tend to incriminate-remote possibilities
of incrimination do not justify the assertion of the privilege.34
Section 3486 provides immunity to the witness "... for or on ac-
count of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is so
compelled ... to testify. . . ." It says nothing about immunity from
those leads or clues gleaned from the testimony which may also fur-
nish links in the chain of evidence against the witness. Yet the
courts have construed similar immunity statutes to so apply. Thus,
if what the witness has related to a congressional committee has a
substantial connection 35-- even by way of leads or clues 3 6 -to the
subject matter of a subsequent prosecution against him, the indict-
ment will be dismissed. Moreover, the protection afforded would
not be limited to a subversive activity type crime which the commit-
tee is investigating, but would also include incidental crimes which
31244 U.S. 362 (1917).
32 See, e.g., Estes v. Potter, 183 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 920 (1951); Kasinowitz v. United States, 181 F.2d 632, 637 (9th
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920 (1951); United States v. St. Pierre,
132 F.2d 837, 838 (2d Cir. 1942); Edelstein v. United States, 149 Fed. 636,
642 (8th Cir. 1906), cert. denied, 205 U.S. 543 (1907). But see Falknor,
Self-Crimination Privilege: "Links in the Chain," 5 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1952)(wherein the author traces the trend of the courts from the Burr and Mason
cases and concludes that the "clue" theory has led courts to allow the privilege
to be asserted where danger of incrimination is remote and speculative).
33 See Counselman v. Uitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), and similar cases
collected in Note, 118 A.L.R. 602 (1939).
3' See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951) ; Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896) ; Camarota v. United States, 111 F.2d 243, 245 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 651 (1940); United States v. Weinberg, 65 F.2d
394, 395 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 675 (1933).
35 Accord, United States v. Eisele, 52 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1943); see
Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 144 (1913) ("When the [immunity]
statute speaks of testimony concerning a matter it means concerning it in a
substantial way, just as the constitutional protection is confined to real danger
and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law.") ;
Lumber Products Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 144 F.2d 546, 553 (9th Cir.
1944), rev'd on other grounds sub non. United Brotherhood of Carpenters &
Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947); United States v.
Greater Kansas City Retail Coal Merchants' Ass'n, 85 F. Supp. 503, 514 (W.D.
Mo. 1949).
3 Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 153 (1949); Edwards v. United
States, 312 U.S. 473 (1941); United States v. Moore, 15 F.2d 593, 594 (D. Ore.
1926).
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happened to be disclosed by the testimony of the witness.31 This is
only a necessary corollary to the principle that immunity, in order
to replace the privilege, must give the same protection that could have
been achieved by it.
Some courts have even extended the scope of immunity statutes
to afford protection to a witness who does not reveal any incriminat-
ing facts 38 or who categorically denies the commission of crimes.39
Other courts, however, disagree, reasoning that the immunity statute
was not enacted to confer a gratuity to criminals, but to seek infor-
mation otherwise not obtainable because of the privilege against self-
incrimination.4 0  Hence, the mere fact of testifying, without disclos-
ing incriminatory facts, should not entitle the witness to immunity.
The latter rule seems more in keeping with the purpose of granting
immunity, but it should be applied with caution in the case of a wit-
ness who, in making denials of his involvement in a crime, incidentally
reveals leads which could be incriminating.
Books, Papers and Records
By virtue of the privilege, a witness can refuse to obey a sub-
poena duces tecum directed at obtaining his documents or papers,41
unless they are public documents 42 or records required to be
kept by law.43  However, the witness cannot claim his privilege
with respect to documents he holds as a custodian or officer of a
corporation 44 or unincorporated association,45 even though these doc-
uments may tend to incriminate him personally.46 In fact the wit-
ness may be required to authenticate or identify these documents by
oral testimony.47
The immunity afforded oral testimony by Section 3486 also ap-
plies to books and records the witness may be compelled to produce.48
37 Cf. United States v. Weinberg, supra note 34.
38 See United States v. Armour & Co., 142 Fed. 808, 822 (N.D. Ill. 1906).
39 See State v. Sacks, 116 Kan. 148, 225 Pac. 738 (1924).
40 Stone v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. App. 211, 256 S.W. 930 (1923); State
v. Carchidi, 187 Wis. 438, 204 N.W. 473 (1925); see State v. Grosnickle, 189
Wis. 17, 206 N.W. 895, 896-897 (1926).
41 Cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361, 383 (1911).
42 See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593 (1946); Wilson v. United
States, supra note 41 at 380.
43 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (records required to be
kept by OPA regulations).
44 Wilson v. United States, supra note 41. The Court stated that if cor-
porate documents are interspersed with private ones, the witness may withdraw
the latter under supervision of the court. Id. at 378, 386.
45 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
46 See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 372-373 (1951).
47 See United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 279 U.S. 863 (1929).
48 As to the extent of the protection see notes 35 and 36 supra.
[ VOL. 29
LEGISLATION
Yet the law is now clear that he will receive no immunity with re-
spect to books and papers which were not subject to the privilege,
such as records required to be kept by law 49 or books of a corpora-
tion 50 or unincorporated association. Again, the theory is that im-
munity should be construed only as coterminous with what otherwise
would have been the privilege of the person concerned.
The Supreme Court has already declared that there is no privi-
lege attaching to the books and records of a state-wide Communist
Party, whether it be a corporation or unincorporated association. 51
The same would probably be true of front-organizations or local cells
of subversives. According to United States v. White,52 if an organ-
ization has an impersonal character so that ". . it cannot be said
to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its
constituents ... ," 53 the privilege cannot be invoked to prevent dis-
closure of its books and records. Any group or organization which
participates in the world-wide communist conspiracy would certainly
not be representing "purely private or personal interests."
Added complications arise under the provisions of the Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950.14  "Communist-action" 5 and "Com-
munist-front" r6 organizations are required to register information
with the Attorney General; 57 they are also required to keep books
indicating how monies are received and how they are expended.58
In addition, members of "Communist-action" organizations must fill
out registration statements containing ". . . such information as the
40 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), criticized in 47 MicH. L.
Rav. 271 (1948) and 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rsv. 235 (1949).
50 Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913), which in effect overrules
the language to the contrary in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 73 (1906);
United States v. Greater Kansas City Retail Coal Merchants' Ass'n, 85 F.
Supp. 503 (W.D. Mo. 1949); see United States v. Frontier Asthma Co., 69
F. Supp. 994, 996-997 (W.D.N.Y. 1947).
51 See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-372 (1951).
52 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
531d. at 701.
54 64 STAT. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (1952).
L A Communist-action organization is ".... any organization in the United
States . . . which (i) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the
foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist
movement . . . and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such
world Communist movement ... and ... any section, branch, fraction, or cell
of [such Communist-action organization] ....." 64 STAT. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C.§ 782(3) (1952).
56 A Communist-front organization is ".. any organization... (other than
a Communist-action organization . . .) which (A) is substantially directed,
dominated, or controlled by a Communist-action organization, and (B) is
primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid and support to a Communist-
action organization, a Communist foreign government, or the world Communist
movement. .. ." 64 STAT. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782(4) (1952).
57 64 STAT. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786(a), (b), (d) (1952).
5864 STAT. 994 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §786(f)(1) (1952).
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Attorney General shall by regulations prescribe." 59 These registra-
tion statements are to be made available for public inspection.6 0
If the Act is enforced-and there are serious doubts as to its
constitutionality 61-the rule which denies the privilege to records re-
quired to be kept by law thus looms in importance. Moreover, as
to members of "Communist-action" organizations, their registration
statements, becoming in effect public records,62 would also not be pro-
tected by the privilege. The member of the "Communist-action"
organization who testifies before a congressional committee may al-
ready have been forced to disclose incriminatory information in his
registration statement without having been afforded immunity from
prosecution. 63 Will his testimony before the committee grant him
such immunity?
The answer to this question poses a further problem. A witness
may be compelled to produce incriminating documents which, because
of their nature (e.g., required to be kept by law, documents of a cor-
poration or unincorporated association), are not protected by the
privilege. At the same time he is also compelled by the committee
to give testimony. Does the testimony he gives work to grant him
immunity? The answer may be found in the rationale of Shapiro
v. United States 64 and Heike v'. United States."- Those cases rea-
soned that the purpose of immunity statutes is to ". . . make evidence
available and compulsory that otherwise could not be got." 66 Hence,
if the witness, in his oral testimony, discloses no more than what
59 64 STAT. 995 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 787 (1952). The Attorney General has
already prescribed the following information: aliases of the registrant; de-
scription of registrant's duties; names of clubs, societies and organizations of
which the registrant is a member; connection with foreign governments or
political parties; and accounts of the registrant's trips abroad. See 28 CoDE
FED. REGs. § 11.207 (Cum. Supp. 1954).
60 64 STAT. 995 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 788(2) (b) (1952). See also 28 CoDE
FED. REGS. § 11.300 (Cum. Supp. 1954).
61 In Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950), the Court held that peti-
tioner was justified in refusing to answer questions relating to her connection
with the Colorado Communist Party. The Court said her answers might tend
to incriminate her of violation of the Smith Act. It would seem, then, that the
Subversive Activities Control Act requires the witness to disclose incriminat-
ing testimony in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See Meltzer, Required
Records, The McCarran Act, and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination,
18 U. OF CHr. L. REv. 687, 724 (1951).
62 See note 60 supra.
63 The Subversive Activities Control Act [64 STAT. 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C.
§ 783(f) (1952)] provides that the fact of registration of any person under
the Act as a member of a Communist organization shall not be used as evi-
dence against him for any violation of a criminal statute. However, this
immunity is not coextensive with the privilege and thus does not give full
protection from prosecution. See note 7 supra.64335 U.S. 1 (1948).
65 227 U.S. 131 (1913).
66 Id. at 142.
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was contained in these non-privileged documents, he would not re-
ceive immunity because he has given the committee nothing which it
did not already have. However, if the witness is compelled to give
new incriminating information, the rule might be otherwise. The
member of the "Communist-action" group who has been required by
law to file a registration statement which becomes open to public
inspection may have signed away his privilege with respect to infor-
mation contained therein. In any event, if the witness is deprived of
immunity, he has lost nothing he had under the privilege. If this be
considered unjust, it is the fault of the courts which have deemed
certain incriminating documents non-privileged, rather than the im-
munity statute, which grants immunity coextensive with the privilege.
Danger of Incrimination for State Crimes
A witness who appears before a congressional committee inves-
tigating subversive activities may incidentally reveal, either directly
or by way of leads, violations of state crimes. Whether he would
receive immunity from state prosecution of those crimes has not con-
clusively been decided, nor has this possibility been a ground for in-
validating federal immunity statutes. 67 There is, however, dicta to
the effect that where the immunity statute broadly confers immunity
for "any" crime disclosed, it means state as well as federal crimes,
and that the federal statute, being the supreme law of the land, must
be obeyed by the states.68 Recently, in Adams v. Maryland,69 the
Supreme Court construed former Section 3486 so as to prohibit the
use in state courts of testimony given before a congressional com-
mittee. The Court said Section 3486 was a legitimate exercise of
congressional power, necessary and proper to carry out its legislative
functions and binding on the state courts as the "Supreme Law of the
Land." It should be noted, however, that former Section 3486 re-
stricted use of testimony; whether the reasoning of the Adams
case would extend to prohibition of state prosecutions remains
unanswered. 70
Even assuming that Section 3486 does not bind the states, it
would not theoretically be an infringement of the privilege since the
courts have ruled that the privilege cannot be raised by the witness
before a federal tribunal on the grounds that his answer may incrim-
inate him of a state crime.71 Yet this rule, resting on a dual-
67 See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 606 (1896); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 68 (1906).
6s See Brown v. Walker, .supra note 67 at 606-608.
68347 U.S. 179 (1954).
70 As to the power of Congress to immunize against state prosecution, see
Comment, 18 ALBANY L. REv. 173, 194-202 (1954).
71 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Camarota v. United
States, 111 F.2d 243 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 651 (1940) ; Graham v.
United States, 99 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1938). "Not until this court pronounced
1954]
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sovereignty concept,72 should not be aggravated by an immunity stat-
ute that compels testimony which might disclose state commission
of crimes.
However, the witness fearing state prosecution is not without
protection. The Supreme Court may affirm the ruling of Common-
wealth v. Nelson,78 which held that the Smith Act superseded a simi-
lar state statute. If so, the danger of state prosecution will be limited
to crimes not involving subversive activities. Even in this field, Sec-
tion 3486, by virtue of the Adams case, forbids the use of his testi-
mony in state courts.74 This would not only protect the witness from
the direct introduction of his testimony against him in a state prosecu-
tion, but would also prevent its use on cross-examination for impeach-
ment purposes.75 Furthermore, Section 3486 states that the witness
cannot refuse to answer on the grounds of self-incrimination. It
would not be contempt of Congress to refuse to answer questions
that are not pertinent to the investigation. 76 The whole tenor of
United States v. DiCarlo 77 indicates that it would not be pertinent
for a congressional committee to ask the witness questions that pry
into the commission of state crimes. Finally, only one case has been
found where a state has convicted a witness who received prosecution
judgment in United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, had it been definitely
settled that one under examination in a federal tribunal could not refuse to
answer on account of probable incrimination under state law." United States
v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933). See 45 HARv. L. Rav. 595 (1932),
for a collection of cases prior to the Murdock decision.
72 For a comprehensive treatment of the dual sovereignty concept and the
privilege against self-incrimination, see Grant, Immunity from Comndsory
Self-Incrimination in a Federal System of Governmeintt II, 9 TaMp. L.Q. 194
(1935).
73377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954). The court reasoned that a federal
statute supersedes a state statute in a field-such as sedition against the United
States-which is of paramount importance to the Federal Government. The
case is being appealed to the Supreme Court. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1954, p. 52,
col. 2. See 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1293 (1954) which comments with approval
on the Nelson case. But see 67 HARV. L. REv. 1419 (1954) which concludes
that the case was an unwarranted invasion of states rights.
7 Section 34 86 (a) (Supp. 1954) provides: ". . . nor shall testimony so
compelled be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding . . . against him in
any court." This is the same language of former Section 3486 which was
construed in the Adams case to apply to state courts. See note 69 supra.
75 See, e.g., Jacobs v. United States, 161 Fed. 694 (1st Cir. 1908); Alkon
v. United States, 163 Fed. 810 (1st Cir. 1908); People v. Carlson, 222 App.
Div. 54, 225 N.Y. Supp. 149 (4th Dep't 1927). However, if the prosecutor
does use the prior immune testimony at the trial in this manner, and the de-
fendant does not object, it would not be reversible error. See Bain v. United
States, 262 Fed. 664, 669 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 252 U.S. 586 (1920).
76 See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 296-299 (1929); McGrain
v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176 (1927) ; see United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d
148 (3d Cir. 1953) (which is an exhaustive treatment of the subject, laying
down the criteria for judging the pertinency of a question).
77 102 F. Supp. 597, 601-602 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
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immunity from a federal tribunal.78 Even there, the state court said
it would have respected the federal immunity statute had the defen-
dant not admitted his crime during the course of the trial. The gen-
eral pattern has been for state courts to give effect to federal immunity
statutes.
7 9
Crime, Penalty or Forfeiture
The privilege protects the witness from disclosures which will
expose him to "criminal prosecution or imposition of a penalty under
federal law"; it does not permit him to withhold facts that would sub-
ject him to civil liabilities.80 Section 3486 provides that the witness
who is compelled to testify shall not "be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture." To illustrate that immunity statutes would
not protect the witness against civil punishments, Judge Cardozo has
stated:
Their purpose [referring to immunity statutes] was to make the Consti-
tution and the statute coextensive and consistent. Penalties and forfeitures, as
the words are used in this exemption, are penalties and forfeitures imposed
upon an offender as part of the punishment of his crime... .8
Thus, various non-criminal penalties could result after a witness
is compelled to testify before a congressional committee investigating
subversive activities. If he is an alien he may be deported since de-
portation proceedings are considered civil in nature; 82 if he is a
lawyer he may be disbarred.8 3 The disqualification of a person from
being a political candidate and from being placed on a voting list is
78 See State v. Verecker, 124 Me. 178, 126 AtI. 827 (1924).
79 See People v. Donnenfeld, 198 App. Div. 918, 189 N.Y. Supp. 951 (2d
Dep't 1921), aff'd iner., 233 N.Y. 526, 135 N.E. 903 (1922) ; People v. Elliot,
123 Misc. 602, 206 N.Y. Supp. 54 (Gen. Sess. 1924) ; Clark v. State, 68 Fla.
433, 67 So. 135 (1914) ; see People v. Lay, 193 Mich. 17, 159 N.W. 299, 303
(1916).80 See Pfitzinger v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 96 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.N.J.),
aff'd men., 192 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1951); see 8 WIGmORPE, EvrDEcE 327 (3d ed.
1940).
81 Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 87, 116 N.E. 782, 784 (1917), cert. denied,
246 U.S. 661 (1918) (emphasis added).
82 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952); Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952). But see Estes v. Potter, 183 F.2d 865, 867(5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920 (1951). Subversive aliens and aliens
who are members of the Communist party may be deported. 66 STAT. 204,
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (6) (B) and (C) (1952).
83 Matter of Rouss, supra note 81 (disbarment not a "penalty or forfeiture"
within the immunity statute); see Matter of Solovei, 250 App. Div. 117, 121,
293 N.Y. Supp. 640, 644 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd mere., 276 N.Y. 647, 12 N.E.2d
802 (1938); see 11 CALIw. L. RIv. 137 (1923) (disbarment proceedings are
not criminal in nature). But ef. Florida State Board of Architecture v.
Seymour, 62 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1952) (proceeding to revoke an architect's cer-
tificate imposes a "penalty or forfeiture" within the meaning of the immunity
statute).
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not a forfeiture or penalty in the criminal sense.8 4 In addition, the
loss of federal employment would not be a criminal punishment.8 5
Moreover, awaiting the witness would be numerous state statutes
which exclude subversives from teaching, public office, and state em-
ployment.8 6 In fact, if the foregoing civil penalties are enforced by
a civil proceeding, the testimony of the witness would be admissible,
since Section 3486 only prohibits subsequent use of compelled testi-
mony in criminal proceedings.
Claiming the Privilege
The witness must specifically claim his privilegesT If he fails
to do so, and discloses incriminating facts, he is deemed to have
waived it.88 Accordingly, Section 3486 provides that the witness
must claim his privilege before he can receive immunity. Some prior
immunity statutes did not contain such a provision, so that a witness
could receive immunity merely by virtue of appearing and testifying.8 9
Under Section 3486 the usual procedure will probably be for the com-
mittee to question the witness to discover what questions he refuses
to answer. Thereupon, the witness, who has already raised his priv-
ilege, will be excused, to be called back later after the committee
notifies the Attorney General and secures the necessary court order. 0
When the witness is recalled he will be compelled to answer. It is
doubtful that in order to receive immunity the witness must again
assert his privilege before each question since the committee is al-
ready aware that he has raised his privilege.9' Moreover, the courts
84See Ross v. Crane, 291 Mass. 28, 195 N.E. 884, 887 (1935).
85 See Pfitzinger v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 96 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.N.J.),
aff'd aene., 192 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1951).
86 For a collection of such statutes, see GELLHORN, THE STATES AND SUB-
VERSION 393-440 (1952).
87 See United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D.D.C. 1951), aff'd,
203 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
88 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) ; Foster v. People, 18
Mich. 265 (1869).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943) ; United States v.
Armour & Co., 142 Fed. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1906).
90 However, Section 3486 does not explicitly require that there be a prior
questioning of the witness before immunity will be granted; it might thus be
possible to grant immunity the very first time the witness appears before the
committee if the necessary court order had been obtained and the Attorney
General had been notified. Nevertheless, the committee report on Section 3486
indicates that the usual procedure will be to conduct a prior hearing to ques-
tion the witness and then to recall him after the committee has investigated
and deliberated on the feasibility of granting him immunity. See H.R. REP. No.
2606, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) in 16 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
5250 (Sept. 5, 1954).
91 See United States v. Goodner, 35 F. Supp. 286 (D. Colo. 1940) (Where,
after the examining officials of the SEC were notified of the claim of im-
munity under a statute similar to Section 3486, it was deemed unnecessary
that the witness assert his privilege before each question.).
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are reluctant to refuse immunity when the witness is led to believe
he has obtained it.92 If, however, the witness does not confine him-
self to directly answering the questions, but volunteers a "spontaneous
outpouring of testimony," he may not receive immunity for informa-
tion so disclosed.93
Privilege Applies to Testimony Before Congressional Committees
Although the Fifth Amendment states that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, the
privilege is available to witnesses who appear before congressional
committees.94  Section 3486 states that no person shall be excused
from testifying "before any committee of either House." 95 However,
the court, in United States v. Brennan,9 6 dealing with former Section
3486, held that no immunity attaches to voluntary statements to com-
mittee counsel acting within the scope of his authority. But the court
implied that a different rule would apply if the testimony were given
under compulsion.
97
Under certain immunity statutes, no immunity attaches to a wit-
ness unless he appears in obedience to a subpoena and testifies under
oath.93 Section 3486 contains no such requirements and hence im-
munity would not be dependent upon the serving of a subpoena or
the administering of an oath.99
Enforcing Immunity Against Subsequent Prosecution
A witness who testifies before a congressional committee inves-
tigating subversive activities obtains immunity from a subsequent
prosecution even though the Government does not use his testimony;
"[t] he application of the immunity provision is dependent upon how
the information is obtained rather than the use to be made of it
thereafter." 100 However, whether immunity attaches to a particular
92 See, e.g., United States v. Monia, supra note 89 at 430 (where the Court
fears the possibility of trapping the witness into believing he has immunity);
United States v. Elton, 222 Fed. 428, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
93 Cf. Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 180-181 (1954).
94See United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (D.D.C. 1951),
aff'd, 203 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (for a full discussion); cf. Ex parte
Johnson, 187 S.C. 1, 196 S.E. 164, 167 (1938).
95 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a) (Supp. 1954) (emphasis added). In proceedings
before a committee, two-thirds of the members of the committee must af-
firmatively vote for a grant of immunity by the committee. Ibid.
96 214 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
97 Id. at 272.98 See, e.g., Sherwin v. United States, 268 U.S. 369 (1925) ; Phelps v. United
States, 160 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1947) ; Bowles v. Chu Mang Poo, 58 F. Supp.
841 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
o9 Cf. United States v. Armour & Co., 142 Fed. 808, 824-825 (N.D. Ill.
1906) ; State v. Sacks, 116 Kan. 148, 225 Pac. 738, 739 (1924).
100 United States v. Molasky, 118 F.2d 128, 134 (7th Cir. 1941), rev'd on
19541
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disclosure does not depend on the opinion of the dispenser of im-
munity. 0 1 "The actual adjudication of immunity can be made only
in a subsequent prosecution of the witness for a crime concerning
which he had testified." 102 The usual procedure for taking advan-
tage of immunity gained by testifying under compulsion has been to
file a plea in bar to a subsequent indictment which could have been
derived from the former testimony. 03 Rule 12 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure has abolished this plea, providing in its place
the motion to dismiss. This motion may be raised before trial and
may be supported by affidavits; the court may grant a hearing on the
motion or defer decision until later in the trial. If there is a pending
indictment and the witness is later compelled to testify before a con-
gressional committee he would gain immunity from further prosecu-
tion and could move to dismiss the indictment. 0 4  And while it is
the general rule that immunity protects from past but not future
crimes, 10 5 one court has held that a conspiracy indictment may be
dismissed even where the witness-conspirators committed one overt
act after they had testified.10 6
Conclusion
Section 3486 offers an opportunity to former subversives, who
have withheld information because of the fear of prosecution, to assist
Congress in its recognized function of investigation. 0 7 The recalci-
trant witness, who had previously abused the privilege, using it as a
shield to protect his own reputation or the infamies of his cohorts, 08
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942) (this par-
ticular point was not raised on appeal). See cases in note 36 supra where the
courts consider whether the testimony "could have" or "might have" led to the
subsequent prosecution.
101 United States v. Weinberg, 65 F.2d 394 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S.
675 (1933).
102 Id. at 396.
103 See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473 (1941) ; Heike v. United
States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913). The law does not recognize the burden and ex-
pense the witness may undergo to establish his immunity. See Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896).
104 Accord, It re Kittle, 180 Fed. 946 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
105 See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 340-341 (1950). There is no
immunity from prosecution for the commission of perjury or contempt during
the course of the congressional investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 3486(d) (Supp. 1954).
106 United States v. Moore, 15 F.2d 593 (D. Ore. 1926).
107 According to Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., many subversives
.. wanted to break with the [Communist] conspiracy once they learned its
real purposes.
"These persons have wanted desperately to resume their normal place in
society, but they have been under the impression that if they .. . told their
story they, themselves inevitably would be subject to prosecution for the role
they had played in the conspiracy." N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1954, p. 16, col. 5.
108 The witness, however, cannot raise the privilege on the grounds that his
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must now choose between fully disclosing information or being cited
for contempt.
There are some who say that immunity statutes are morally
questionable since they result in the Government making "deals"
with "stoolies" and "turncoats." 109 If this be true, we should legis-
late against this "immorality" by placing information gained from
"informers" in the same category as that derived from wiretapping
or illegal searches and seizures. Such an attitude, however, would
thwart legislatures and law enforcement agencies from effectively
carrying out their duties of investigation.
Immunity statutes have been construed so as to give protection
to the witness coextensive to that afforded by the privilege. As fur-
ther construction problems arise it may be well for the courts to
weigh the advice of Chief Justice John Marshall:
When two principles come in conflict with each other, the court must give
them both a reasonable construction, so as to preserve them both to a reason-
able extent. The principle which entitles the United States to the testimony
of every citizen, and the principle by which every witness is privileged not to
accuse himself, can neither of them be entirely disregarded.110
A
EMERGENCY CALLS GIVEN PRECEDENCE ON PARTY LINES
BY NEw YORK STATUTE
Due to the enterprise of American capital, the telephone has be-
come so commonplace in the United States that most people regard
it as a necessity. Although it has been in use for three-quarters of
a century, changing social conditions and improved methods of trans-
mission have prevented the law of telephones from ossification and
rigidity. Since the telephone is essentially an improvement upon the
answer would disgrace him. 12 STAT. 333 (1862), as amended, 2 U.S.C.
§ 193 (1952). See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896). Moreover,
the privilege is personal and cannot be raised to protect others. Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
109 See, e.g., King, Inmpntity for Witnesses: An Inventory of Caveats, 40
A.B.A.J. 377, 378-379 (1954). But Dr. Bella Dodd, a former Communist,
told a congressional committee: "I think probably more than anything else
the reason why you are not getting many citizens coming forward to testify
in this Country on the Communist conspiracy is the fear that they have of the
smear and the retaliation which the Communists will have upon them.
"One of the things they do, of course, is to use . . . underworld concepts
of informer, stool pigeon, a person who sings, and so forth... " The Tablet,
Sept. 28, 1954, p. 18, col. 6.
110 United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,692e, 38, at 39-40 (C.C.D.
Va. 1807).
